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Introduction
In prewar Japan the main source of external funds for large, non-financial firms was stock issuance. Bank loans were normally short-term (about 60 days or 90 days) and often rolled over; they were a source of industrial firms' working funds. The amount of bank debts was usually less than that of share capital for large firms. Corporate bond issuances, however, increased rapidly after 1924 and became the main source of external funds for large firms in the second half of the 1920s, although their importance diminished in the 1930s. The reasons for bond dominance were as follows. First, firms found it difficult to issue new shares because stock prices plunged in 1920 and did not recover in the 1920s. Second, the electric power industry and electric railroad industry, which required large amounts of long-term funds because of their high ratio of fixed assets, developed significantly after the First World War, and corporations in these industries raised a huge amount of funds on bond markets. Moreover, while the commercial code permitted companies to issue bonds up to the amount of their paid-up capital, a 1927 revision of the Electric Power Companies Law permitted companies in the electric power industry to issue bonds up to two times their paid-up capital. The amount of corporate bonds issued between 1925 and 1935 was almost as large as that of national bonds and twice as large as that of local bonds and bank debentures respectively, although the amount of national bonds issued after 1936 increased greatly because of hostilities with China and was several times as large as the individual amount of other three kinds of bonds issued after 1936. 1 Most banks held only a few shares of stock and rarely underwrote them because they regarded stocks as risky. Rather than purchasing stocks, financial institutions such as banks, trust companies, and insurance companies purchased more than half of the bonds issued in the interwar period. As a result of bond purchases, the average ratio of securities held by ordinary banks to their total assets increased from 0.15 in 1925 to 0.27 in 1936. Many banks accumulated huge amounts of bad debts due to price declines in the interwar period and faced multiple, severe bank runs. Sound banks, however, invested in bonds in order to avoid accumulating bad debt and survived this period of banking crises. 2 As large amounts of bonds were issued, bond transactions in secondary markets naturally increased. National bonds had been listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (hereafter, TSE) since its establishment in 1878, but transaction volume had been minor except between 1878 and 1884. In order to promote bond transactions, national bond brokers in 1920 were separated from general brokers, who mainly engaged in stock futures transactions, and bond trading on the TSE began to increase thereafter. Margin buying and selling of national bonds began on the TSE in 1925. Local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds were listed only on the cash market and their transaction amounts were much smaller than those for national bonds. In the 1930s transactions of the four kinds of bonds, especially those of national bonds, increased rapidly on the TSE. I assume the amount of bonds traded over the counter by securities firms to have been several times as much as that of bonds traded on the TSE, even in the 1930s, although the amount of over-the-counter transactions is unclear.
This paper aims to shed light on banks' bond holding and trading in interwar Japan.
First, in Section Two, it analyzes why banks, which were principal investors in bonds in the interwar period, bought bonds instead of making loans. Second, in Section Three, it examines how banks dealt in bonds, that is, whether banks usually bought newly issued bonds and held them until their redemption dates or not. If they did buy new issues and hold until redemption, I assume that secondary markets for bonds were thin and bonds were highly illiquid assets for banks. If banks did not usually buy newly issued bonds and hold them until their redemption dates, I assume that secondary markets were thick, bonds liquid, and banks adapted their portfolios to financial market conditions for higher yields or lower risk. In addition, this paper also inquires, in Section Three, whether banks' bond trading changed during the interwar period. The final section summarizes the above considerations and points out factors affecting banks' bond trading.
Banks' Motives to Hold Bonds
Although the amount of loans by ordinary banks continued to decline between 1926 and 1934, the amount of securities held by them increased between 1925 and 1936 except for a slight decrease between 1929 and 1931 (see Fig. 1 ). In 1925 one half of securities held by ordinary banks were national bonds, one quarter were bank debentures and corporate bonds, one-fifth were stocks, and one-tenth were local bonds (see Fig. 2 ). The amount of bank debentures and corporate bonds owned by ordinary banks increased significantly between 1925 and 1928, and the amount of national bonds decreased between 1929 and 1931. Therefore, the ratio of bank debentures and corporate bonds to the total amount of securities increased until 1931. After 1932, however, the amount of national bonds increased rapidly. As a result, the ratio of national bonds increased and the ratio of bank debentures and corporate bonds decreased. On the other hand the ratio of local bonds was stable, while the ratio of stocks continued to decline during the period under consideration. I assume that ordinary banks reduced national bonds in order to cope with decreases in deposits during the Great Depression. NB, LB, and BDCB stand for the ratio of the amount of national bonds, local bonds, and bank debentures and corporate bonds, respectively, held by ordinary banks in each prefecture to the total amount of paid-up capital, reserves, and deposits of ordinary banks in each prefecture. OFFICE is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if one or more offices of five major securities firms or Nihon Kangyō Securities Co. existed in each prefecture, and otherwise equals 0. SPREAD stands for the spread between the average rate of advances on a promissory note and the average rate of six-month time deposits in each prefecture. CAPRAT denotes the ratio of the sum of paid-up capital and reserves of ordinary banks to the sum of paid-up capital, reserves, and deposits of ordinary banks in each prefecture. Table 1 shows regression results. The coefficients of SPREAD (c1, c2, and c3) are negative and significant except for c2 in 1936. I assume that banks in a prefecture where the spread was small -that is, where the demand for money was low -purchased more bonds to use surplus funds. Moreover, in 1928 the absolute value of c3 is the largest of the three absolute values of coefficients and that of c2 is the smallest. In 1932 this order of the three coefficients remains; but in 1936 the absolute value of c1 is larger than that of c3. I assume the reason for this reversal as follows. Table 2 . Each bank except for Mitsubishi
Bank was the largest bank in its prefecture (Mitsubishi Bank was the fourth largest in Tokyo). They preferred securities to loans in comparison with other banks and took higher places in order of securities than in order of deposits.
Before considering individual bank's bond trading, however, I explore bond underwriting and distribution. 4 First, national bonds were underwritten by large banks after 1911, such banks distributing the bonds themselves, and through other banks and securities firms. Securities firms sometimes sub-underwrote these bonds. In 1932, however, the Bank of Japan began to purchase national bonds directly from the government and sell them to banks and other financial institutions. Second, local bonds issued by Tokyo City, Osaka City, and Nagoya City -Japan's three largest cities -were usually underwritten by large banks in the respective cities. an agreement on bond issuance. They declared that they would give preference to, and only underwrite, secured bonds issued by firms that had established sinking funds. They suggested that trust companies and securities firms should buy and sell only bonds to which they gave preference. After this agreement, large banks and trust companies typically formed a syndicate to underwrite corporate bonds, and large securities firms, National bonds were mainly purchased in secondary markets between 1926 and 1929 and between 1933 and 1935, although they were purchased in primary markets during the Depression (see Table 4 First, the credibility of these bonds varies by issuer; and maturity, coupon rates, and redemption dates also vary from issue to issue. Thus, it is difficult to find buyers for an issue of these bonds, as compared with national bonds, when an investor intends to sell them before the redemption date. Thus, trading of these kinds of bonds is generally less active than that of national bonds (for national bonds a few benchmark bonds are traded actively but others are not traded as actively). Second, issuances of refunding bonds increased and these refunding bonds sold well in the middle of the 1930s. Moreover, many holders of redeemed bonds were able to apply for newly issued bonds in exchange for redeemed ones. Thus, underwriters like Mitsubishi Bank came, after the Great Depression, to be able to sell them easily in the year of issuance (and were not compelled to sell bonds in the year following issuance) as compared with the second half of the 1920s. Finally, banks came to form syndicates to underwrite corporate bonds more often after the agreement in 1933 than in the 1920s. Securities firms also formed underwriting syndicates for local bonds and sub-underwriting syndicates for corporate bonds more often after the formation of Rokusankai in 1931 than in the 1920s. 11 As bonds came to be underwritten and distributed cooperatively, underwriters came to hold few underwritten bonds except for bonds that they decided to add to their portfolio in advance. Note: See Table 3 . The amounts of sale of national bonds, local bonds, and corporate bonds in 1933 are ¥2,267,700, ¥200,000, and ¥903,000 respectively. 
